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Summary 
Since 1809 the loss of Finland has been discussed in different ways in Swedish history 
research. In the early 20th century the burst of the state was seen in a nationalistic per-
spective. It was said that the people in Sweden, or the “public opinion”, with despair 
and in a “nationalistic trauma” received the news bulletins from the peace agreement 
in Fredrikshamn 1809, which was interpreted the worst defeat ever in Swedish history. 
Nowadays researchers argue whether the loss of Finland really was seen as a national-
istic trauma in the early 19th century. The article first summarises the background of 
the war and the most important war episodes and then discusses the apprehension of a 
Sweden in national chock after the burst of the state. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Verlust Finnlands 1809 wurde in der schwedischen Hisoriographie unter unter-
schiedlichen Vorzeichen diskutiert. Während des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts wurde das 
Aufbrechen des Staates aus einer nationalistischen Perspektive betrachtet. Man argu-
mentierte, dass die Menschen in Schweden, oder die „öffentliche Meinung“, die 
Nachricht vom Friedensschluss in Fredrikshamn 1809 mit Verzweifelung und unter der 
Prämisse eines „nationalen Traumas“entgegengenommen hätten, so dass dieser als 
schlimmste Niederlage in der schwedischen Geschichte interpretiert wurde. Zeitgenös-
sische Forscher hinterfragen, ob der Verlust Finnlands im frühen 19. Jahrhundert tat-
sächlich als nationales Trauma empfunden wurde. Dieser Artikel fasst zunächst den 
Hintergrund des Krieges und seine wichtigsten Ereignissen zusammen, um im An-
schluss das Verständnis von Schweden im Zustand eines nationalen Schocks nach der 
Abtrennung Finnlands zu problematisieren.  
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Introduction 
The most important political consequence of the Finnish War, fought between Sweden 
and Russia from 1808 to 1809, was the ensuing annexation of Finland as an autono-
mous part of Russia. The peace treaty, signed in the Finnish city of Fredrikshamn in 
September 1809, cost Sweden one third of its territory and one fourth of its population. 
Since the 14
th century Finland had been politically, culturally and economically inte-
grated in the Swedish realm, but from the 17
th of September 1809 onwards, it was con-
sequently separated from “the motherland.”
1  
Swedish historical research often describes the loss of Finland, or the partitioning of 
the Swedish state, as the most painful peace treaty in Swedish history. Some scholars 
have even portrayed the Treaty of Fredrikshamn as a national trauma or even as a na-
tional catastrophe. But even though the loss of Finland can be seen as a disaster, one 
can also assert that both Finland and Sweden benefited greatly due to this treaty. For 
 
 
 
1   In recent years, due to the 200-year remembrance of the cession of Finland, a great deal of 
attention has been paid in Sweden and Finland to the war of 1808–1809 and its conse-
quences. For example, there have been conferences and exhibitions on the topic. Addition-
ally, a great number of books and articles have been written. See for example: Linder, Jan: 
Riket sprängs 1809, Sverige och Finland under Napoleonkrigen. Stockholm 2008; Fors-
gård, Nils Erik: September 1808. Stockholm 2009; Lundin, Lars: Kriget som bär Napole-
ons skugga: Finska kriget 1808-1809. Helsingfors 2008; Gullberg, Tom et al: Finskt krig – 
svenskt arv: Finlands historia genom nyckelhålet 1808-1809. Helsingfors 2008; Malm-
borg, Ingvar von (ed.): Stormvindar: En bok om ödesåret 1809. Stockholm 2009; Engman, 
Max (ed.):  Fänrikens marknadsminne: Finska kriget 1808-1809 och dess följder i 
eftervärldens ögon. Helsingfors 2009; Jansson, Torkel: Rikssprängningen som kom av sig. 
Stockholm 2009; Gussarsson Wijk, Maria: “Kartan och kriget: finska kriget 1808-1809 i 
Krigsarkivets samlingar”. In: Biblis  12 (2009:1), 112–120; Kuvaja, Christer et al: Det 
åländska folkets historia, 4, från finska kriget till Ålandsrörelsen, 1808-1920. Mariehamn 
2008; Sandin, Per (ed.): Rikssprängning och begynnelse: 200-årsminnet av finska kriget. 
Helsingfors 2009; Jarolf, Tage: “Med kriget i biblioteket: inredningsarkitekt Kaj Johans-
son och hans samling skrifter om Finska kriget 1808-1809”. In: Tage Jarolf (ed.): När jag 
får lite pengar så köper jag böcker. Helsingfors 2008, 65–109; Mickwitz, Joachim (ed.): 
Havet, minnet, slaget: kriget 1808–1809. Stockholm 2009; Bergquist, Mats: “Var kriget 
1808-1809 oundvikligt? Legitimitet och svenska optioner”. In: Kungliga krigsvetenskap-
sakademiens handlingar och tidskrifter 213 (2009:3), 85–98; Asplund Ingemark, Camilla 
and Wassholm, Johanna: Historiska sägner om 1808–1809 års krig. Helsingfors 2009; 
Klinge, Matti:  Napoleons skugga: baler, bataljer och Finlands tillkomst.  Helsingfors 
2009.
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example, there were no wars in the 19
th century between Sweden and Russia, whereas 
in the 18
th century there were three. Sweden has in fact not been involved in any major 
wars since the Finnish War of 1808–1809. Peace and the absence of costly wars were 
important prerequisites for the economic growth that Sweden experienced during the 
19
th century. In Finland, the new political position as a relatively autonomous grand 
duchy of the Russian Empire had arguably positive results. Finland gained the oppor-
tunity to slowly develop its own political and economical institutions. Formally, 
Finland was a part of Russia, but in practice Finland resembled an independent state 
with its own legislature, which in fact followed Swedish law (Sveriges Rikes Lag) 
from 1734. This practical self-rule lasted until the so-called ‚Russification’ of Finland 
at the end of the 19
th century. Finland would probably not have had the same level of 
autonomy had it remained part of Sweden. Additionally, had Sweden won the Finnish 
War of 1808–1809, there would likely have been several more devastating wars fought 
on Finnish territory.  
The Napoleonic Wars and the Treaty of Tilsit 
The war between Sweden and Russia in 1808–1809 must be discussed in the broader 
context of the Napoleonic Wars (1800-1815), which influenced all states in Europe in one 
way or another.
2 In the beginning, Sweden adopted a neutral stance and did not take part 
in any coalition activities against France. However, Sweden’s relations with France were 
successively strained; after 1804 it was palpable that Sweden was hostile to France and 
above all to Napoleon Bonaparte. The Swedish king Gustav IV Adolf was an outspoken 
enemy of Napoleon, whom he saw as an illegitimate ruler. Thereafter, diplomatic rela-
tions between Sweden and France were cancelled and French newspapers and books 
were rigorously censored. In 1805, Sweden declared war on France in the Pomeranian 
war of 1805–1807. The result was a humiliating defeat for Sweden: many Swedish sol-
diers and officers were captured by the French. The commander of the French forces was 
 
 
 
2   For surveys about Sweden in the Napoleonic wars and the war against Russia, see Carls-
son, Sten and Rosén, Jerker: Svensk historia II – Tiden efter 1718. Stockholm 1961; Sand-
ström, Allan: Sveriges sista krig. Örebro 1994; Hårdstedt, Martin: Finska kriget 1808–
1809. Stockholm 2006.
NORDEUROPAforum 19 (2009:2)  63 Henrik Edgren 
a marshal named Jean Baptiste Bernadotte. In the summer of 1810, he was elected as the 
new heir to the Swedish throne after the dethroning of Gustav IV Adolf.  
As an antagonist to France, Sweden benefited from British economic and political assis-
tance. Great Britain was France’s strongest enemy during the Napoleonic Wars. The dip-
lomatic relationship with Great Britain was a very important element in Swedish foreign 
policy during the Napoleonic Wars. Temporarily, British maritime military forces were 
even stationed in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia as a protection against Russian, 
French and Danish forces. 
From the Nordic and Swedish-Finnish perspectives, the peace treaty of Tilsit in July 1807 
is a very important explanation of the Russian attack on Finland in February 1808. At 
that time, Napoleon Bonaparte and France were at the height of their power and nothing 
seemed to be able to end French successes on the battlefields of Europe. The coalition 
powers Austria, Prussia and Russia were defeated at the significant battles of Austerlitz 
(1805), Jena (1806), Auerstädt (1806) and Friedland (1807). Great Britain had not yet 
been beaten, but at this time the Britons were defensive and mainly focused on securing 
their maritime dominions. In Tilsit, the Russian emperor Alexander I accepted, at least 
temporarily, French hegemony in Central Europe. In exchange, Napoleon gave Alexan-
der I the right to act freely in Northern Europe, preferably against Sweden and Finland. 
Another important French aim of the Tilsit treaty was to forge an economic blockade di-
rected against Great Britain. Therefore all European states, including Sweden, were 
forced not to take part in any commerce with British interests. This blockade, which was 
called “the continental system”, was in fact very ineffective. Smuggling flourished, above 
all in Swedish cities such as Karlshamn and Gothenburg. 
Sweden maintained, not formally but in practice, its political and economical ties to 
Great Britain. This was not the case for Denmark, which resulted in a brutal British bom-
bardment of Copenhagen in the beginning of September 1807. Thereafter, Denmark was 
an outspoken enemy of Great Britain and thus a loyal ally to France, a development 
which was very ominous for Sweden. Now it was surrounded by enemies: Russia in the 
East, France to the South West and the Denmark-Norway to the West. The political situa-
tion in Sweden was consequently very precarious in the autumn of 1807. Soon Russia, 
Sweden’s arch-enemy since the 18
th century, launched an attack on Finland. 
64 NORDEUROPAforum 19 (2009:2) When Finland was lost  
When Finland was lost, the king dethroned and a new constitution inaugurated 
The Russians had probably planned an attack on Finland for a long time. For them, it was 
important to gain control over the Baltic Sea for military and economic reasons. There-
fore, Alexander I was eager to conquer Finland, especially the southern parts of the coun-
try. In fact, this had been a Russian aim since Saint Petersburg had become the capital of 
Russia in 1712. In the 18
th century, Sweden and Russia had fought wars over Finland three 
times. During the Great Northern War of 1700–1721 and during the war of the 1740s, 
Finland even was periodically occupied by Russia. 
Consequently, the attack on the 22
nd of February, 1808, when Russian forces crossed the 
Kymmene river in southeastern Finland, should not have been the shock for the Swedish 
military that it was. Only a few days prior to the attack the Swedish envoy to Saint Peters-
burg, Curt von Stedingk, was assured that the Russian emperor did not plan an assault. 
However, there were many signs, such as large troop movements, that indicated an up-
coming Russian invasion. Maybe the Swedish military leadership, including the king and 
the commander of the Finnish army Wilhelm Mauritz von Klingspor (who was in Sweden 
when the attack was launched!) thought that the winter was too cold for military activities. 
On the night of the 21
st of February, the temperature was 30 degrees below zero (Celsius), 
and there was heavy snowfall. Perhaps the Swedish leadership expected Alexander I to 
focus on strategic interests in Central and Eastern Europe, above all in the regions belong-
ing to the Ottoman Empire, instead of attacking Finland. As a result of this, the Russians 
encountered hardly any resistance at all in the beginning of the war. The Swedish forces 
even neglected the destroying of some important bridges, and as a result of this, Russian 
troops could easily reach the southern parts of Finland. 
The Swedish military plan presupposed that the Finnish Army would retreat to central and 
northern Finland to wait for reinforcements during spring and summer of 1808. Fortresses 
such as Svartholm and Sveaborg, situated at the coast of the Baltic Sea, were expected to 
resist Russian attacks and become important centres for possible future counterattacks.  
On the 22
nd of March, the conquerors won an important victory when the main city in 
Finland at that time, Åbo, was conquered. Symbolically, the Russian takeover of Åbo was 
very important, since the Russians henceforward controlled the centres of the church and 
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the university as well as important administrative organs.
3 It was even more crucial that 
the dignitaries of Åbo – university teachers, priests and merchants – voluntarily accepted 
the Russian invasion. In general, the occupation of southern Finland proceeded quite 
calmly. The people in Finland were tired of devastating wars in which they always lost 
people and economic assets. The Russians also promised that Finland would not be forced 
into serfdom or Russian-Orthodox Christianity. It was important for the Russians that the 
locals cooperated, since the Russian army, as well as the Swedish one, needed supplies of 
food, shelter and horses for the army. Generally, the Russians solved logistic problems 
better than the Swedes did.
4
Resistance against the Russian invasion was more common among Finland’s lower social 
classes, such as peasants, burghers and craftsmen. There were even some brutal peasant 
rebellions on the Åland Islands and in Österbotten, which the Russians feared very much. 
However, the Swedish king and military leadership were disappointed with the fact that so 
few Finnish peasants revolted against the conquerors. In fact, the absence of peasant rebel-
lions was one important reason why the Swedish counter offensive failed in the summer 
of 1808.
5
As I mentioned earlier, the fortress of Sveaborg was essential for the Swedish war plan. 
The Russians realised that with the taking of Sveaborg, they would undisputedly control 
the southern coast of Finland. In March 1808 they besieged the fortress, which had ap-
proximately 6 800 soldiers, 2 000 artillery pieces and a great number of war vessels. In 
spite of his orders to defend Sveaborg, the commander – Admiral Carl Olof Cronstedt – 
surrendered quite easily on the 6
th of May, 1808. Even if the loss of Sveaborg did not de-
termine the outcome of the war, it had a great negative symbolic impact on the army and 
 
 
 
3   The university, which was founded by the Swedish queen Christina in 1640, was moved to 
Helsinki in 1827 and renamed “The Imperial Alexander University” (“Kejserliga Alexander-
suniversitetet”). Before, it was called “The Royal Academy of Åbo” (“Kungliga Akademien i 
Åbo”).
4   Martin Hårdstedt has convincingly argued that logistical dilemmas caused a large number 
of problems for Swedish warfare. In fact, Hårdstedt´s point is that Swedish logistical fail-
ures are one important explanation of why Sweden lost the war. See: Hårdstedt, Martin: 
Om krigets förutsättningar – Den militära underhållsproblematiken och det civila sam-
hället i norra Sverige och Finland under finska kriget 1808–1809. Umeå 2002.
5   About the peasant resistance, see Persson, Anders: 1808: Gerillakriget i Finland. Stock-
holm 1986.
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on the military leadership, since the fortress of Sveaborg was perceived to be impenetra-
ble. It also remains unknown why Cronstedt surrendered. Until today, scholars have not 
been able to give a satisfying answer to the question why Sveaborg was abandoned. Per-
haps the admiral was convinced that the war would be lost anyway, irrespective of the 
possession of Sveaborg. It is obvious that many of the soldiers at the fortress did not share 
the opinions of their commander. Some of them were very disappointed and some wanted 
to kill the admiral on the spot. In the historiography of the Finnish war, Cronstedt has ever 
since been portrayed as one of the worst traitors in Swedish history. 
From the spring of 1808 onwards, the battles of the Finnish War were mainly fought in the 
regions of Savolax, the Åland Islands and Österbotten. During this phase, the Finnish 
Army won some prestigious victories. In April, Russian forces were defeated in the battles 
of Siikajoki and Revolax. In the middle of July, the Russians were beaten in the famous 
battle of Lappo. At this time, the Finnish army doubtlessly was quite successful and some 
of its leaders – for example Georg Carl von Döbeln, Johan August Sandels and Carl Johan 
Adlercreutz – were looked upon as war heroes.  
However, Swedish and Finnish victories were only occasional. A major Swedish counter-
offensive, orchestrated by the Swedish king from the Åland Islands in the summer of 
1808, was a total failure. Soon, the Russians came back with more soldiers and forced the 
Finnish army to withdraw to the northern parts of Finland. After the decisive battle of 
Oravais, on the 14
th of September 1808, the Finnish army had to retreat constantly until it 
crossed the border into Sweden in December of 1808.
6 Finland was lost and would never 
again be a part of Sweden. At the time of the battle of Oravais, which was one of the 
bloodiest clashes in the war, there were around 18 000 soldiers in the Finnish Army.
7 Due 
to illnesses (mostly typhoid fever and dysentery), deaths in battles and desertions, the 
army was reduced to around 8 000 men when it came to Sweden a couple of months later. 
 
 
 
6   At the time of the war, the Swedish army was organized into three parts: The southern 
army (stationed in the south of Sweden), the western army (stationed in the west of Swe-
den against an attack from Denmark–Norway) and the Finnish army. In the Finnish army 
there were officers and soldiers from both Sweden and Finland. 
7   In Oravais, 740 Swedish and 900 Russian soldiers died in the battle field. Many soldiers 
on both sides later died from injuries received during the fighting. For more information 
about the battle of Oravais, see Backman, Göran (ed.): Slaget vid Oravais 1808–2008: 
200-årsminnet av “två ödesdagar” i Nykarleby och Oravais 13-14 september. Oravais 
2008.
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In March 1809 the political situation in Sweden was very serious. Finland was definitely 
lost and there were Russian troops on the Åland Islands as well as in the northern parts of 
Sweden (around the cities of Umeå and Skellefteå). For some days in March 1809, there 
had also been a Russian contingent, under the leadership of the legendary commander 
Jakov Kulnev, in Grisslehamn, just 60 kilometres from Stockholm. At the same time there 
was a concrete military threat from the west, where the Danes, supported by the French, 
were ready to attack Sweden. Consequently, the existence of an independent Sweden was 
at stake; there were even plans for Russia and Denmark to conquer and divide Sweden 
amongst them. 
At the same time, dissatisfaction with the Swedish king Gustav IV Adolf was widespread, 
especially among high-ranking military officials who blamed the king for the failure of the 
war in Finland. Many politicians and public officials were also discontented with Swe-
den’s opposition to Napoleon and France. They blamed Gustav IV Adolf for repudiating 
Bonaparte, which they believed had caused Sweden’s loss of Finland. The financial advi-
sors in the government also disagreed constantly with the king. The main dispute was 
about the king’s plans to recapture Finland in the spring of 1809. On the 13
th of March 
Gustav IV Adolf was dethroned in a bloodless coup d’état. It was in fact a general from 
the Finnish army, Carl Johan Adlercreutz, who arrested the king at the castle in Stock-
holm. It is remarkable that a Swedish army contingent (the Western army), under the 
command of Georg Adlersparre, marched from the Western parts of Sweden (Karlstad) to 
Stockholm in support of the coup d’état.
8 One very significant result of dethroning Gustav 
IV Adolf was that a new constitution was legislated on the 6
th of June in 1809.
9 The main 
aim of that constitution was to avoid an autocratic ruler as well as an overly powerful par-
liament. Sweden had experienced deterrent examples of autocratic rulers during the reign 
of Gustav the III (1771–1792) and his son Gustav IV Adolf (1796–1809).
10 The negative 
 
 
 
8   About the march of the western army from Karlstad to Stockholm, see Hemström, Mats: 
Marschen mot makten: västra arméns revolt och väg till Stockholm 1809. Uppsala 2005.
9   Sweden celebrates its national day on the 6
th of June as a remembrance of the creation of 
the constitution. Accordingly, in 2009 several books have been published which have fo-
cused on the constitution of 1809 and its consequences, see for example Brundin, Marga-
reta and Isberg, Magnus (eds.): Maktbalans och kontrollmakt – 1809 års händelser, idéer 
och författningsverk i ett tvåhundraårigt perspektiv. Stockholm 2009. 
10   Since Gustav IV Adolf was too young to be a king when his father died, Sweden was ruled 
by a regency from 1792–1796.
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experiences of a strong and self ruling parliament during the era of 1718–1772 (“the age 
of liberty”) were also important when the new constitution was forged. Now it was de-
cided that the political institutions of Sweden would rest upon three pillars: the king, the 
parliament and the Supreme Court. In reality, the Supreme Court had limited powers. It 
was mainly the power balance between the king/government and the parliament that was 
elaborated. To control the government and the parliament, freedom of the press was legis-
lated in March 1810. In fact, it was already introduced directly after the coup d’état. The 
constitution of 1809 was legally valid until 1974; of course, there were many amendments 
and supplements, but its long duration demonstrates how important it has been. It is obvi-
ous that it would not have been implemented in 1809 if the king had not been dethroned 
and the coup d’état would not have occurred if Sweden had won the war. 
The immediate threat from Denmark disappeared when French troops, under the leader-
ship of Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, left Denmark in the spring of 1809. There were still Rus-
sian troops in the north of Sweden but after two major battles at Sävar and Ratan in Au-
gust 1809, the war between Sweden and Russia ended. The peace agreement in 
Fredrikshamn was settled, after some disputes, on the 17
th of September 1809. It was de-
cided that Finland, as a Grand Duchy, should be a part of the Russian Empire, that the 
Åland Islands would belong to Russia, that the northern border between Sweden and Rus-
sia would be placed at the Torneå and Muonio rivers and that Sweden would join the con-
tinental blockade against Great Britain. The partitioning of the Swedish state was now a 
reality. How have Swedish historical scholars dealt with this fact? 
Swedish historical research about the partitioning of the Swedish state in 1809 
Most Swedish historical surveys of the loss of Finland and its consequences are written by 
historians who lived at the end of the 19
th or at the beginning of the 20
th centuries. This 
was an era when the academic discipline of history was rather young and chiefly influ-
enced by nationalistic ideas.
11 Towards the end of the 19
th century, mass nationalism fo-
 
 
 
11   For more information about the nationalistic and state-centric historical paradigm in Swe-
den in the end of the 19
th century, see Zander, Ulf: Fornstora dagar, moderna tider – Bruk 
av debater om svensk historia från sekelskifte till sekelskifte. Lund 2001, 75f; Torstendahl, 
Rolf: Källkritik och vetenskapssyn i svensk historisk forskning 1820–1920. Uppsala 1964, 
181.
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cussing on the state’s unique ethnicity, language, culture and history had a breakthrough 
all over Europe – Sweden and Finland were no exceptions. The British historian Eric 
Hobsbawm has discussed this era of European history as a period when the state con-
sciously invented or strengthened national myths and traditions. National anthems were 
introduced; the state sponsored and built national museums and national parks; people 
started to wave flags; states competed with each other at events such as world exhibitions 
or Olympic Games.
12  
Seen through this nationalistic lens, history became very important to prove how the 
dominant nation of the state had a glorious past. In the case of Sweden, scholars focused 
on the honourable past of the 17
th and early 18
th centuries when Sweden had been a Euro-
pean power. The founding father of Sweden, Gustav Vasa, and the kings Gustav II Adolf, 
Karl IX, Karl X, Karl XI and Karl XII got a lot of attention, since they had made Sweden 
famous throughout Europe. In this context, the loss of Finland in 1809 was also important, 
as it was seen as a final blow to a Swedish supremacy of Northern Europe. After the parti-
tioning of the state, Sweden gradually became an insignificant power in the outskirts of 
Europe.  
For the nationalist historians of the early 20
th century, it was obvious that the humiliating 
loss of Finland was a traumatic national catastrophe. They took it for granted that the peo-
ple in the early 19
th century had shared similar feelings. For example, the very well known 
Swedish historian Carl Grimberg, in 1923, stated: 
With despair in their hearts, the Swedish representatives in Fredrikshamn on the 17
th of Sep-
tember 1809 had to sign the saddest peace agreement ever in Swedish history, a peace that 
tore Finland, the Åland islands and Swedish Lappland in Västerbotten, near the rivers of 
Torneå and Muonio, from the Swedish motherland: a country that had given the people of 
Finland its free society, its religion and its culture.
13
 
 
 
12   Hobsbawm Eric: Nationer och nationalism [Nations and nationalism]. Stockholm 1990, 106.
13  ”Med förtvivlan i hjärtat måste de svenska ombuden i Fredrikshamn den 17 september 1809 
underteckna den sorgligaste fred vårt land någonsin slutit, en fred som lösryckte hela Finland 
jämte Åland samt svenska Lappmarken med Västerbotten intill Muonio och Torneå älvar från 
det svenska moderlandet, från det land, som givit Finlands folk dess fria samhällsordning, dess 
religion och kultur.” Grimberg, Carl: Svenska folkets underbara öden VIII. 1809 års män, Karl 
Johans och Oskar I:s tid samt vårt näringsliv och kommunikationsväsen under teknikens ti-
devarv. Stockholm 1923, 46.
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Grimberg was not alone in his grieving for Finland.
14 In fact, until very recently this inter-
pretation of the annexation of Finland has dominated Swedish historical surveys, not only 
in textbooks, of how people in Sweden perceived the situation. From the 1960s the na-
tionalist paradigm in Swedish academic history writing has been weakening. The nation-
alistic apprehension of 1809 has slowly been questioned and criticized. Scholars have be-
come less focused on what happened in the war and why it was lost. They are more 
interested in long-term political, cultural, economical and social consequences for people 
in Sweden as well as in Finland.
15 When such new historical questions are posed, it be-
comes evident that the notion of a country in national shock or despair after 1809 is far 
from an obvious reality.  
 
 
 
14   See for example: Boëthius, Simon Johannes: Sveriges historia från äldsta tid till våra dagar. 
Stockholm  1879;  Odhner, Clas Theodor:  Lärobok i fäderneslandets historia samt grund-
dragen af Norges och Danmarks historia – För skolans lägre klasser. Stockholm  1902; 
Clason, Sam and Hildebrand, Emil: Sveriges historia. Stockholm 1910; Andersson, Ingvar: 
Sveriges historia. Stockholm 1938; Höjer, Torvald T:son: Karl XIV Johan – Kronprinstiden. 
Stockholm  1954;  Carlsson and Rosén  1961, as footnote 2; Elenius, Lars:  “Förlusten av 
Finland – ett svenskt trauma”. In: Raoul Granqvist (ed.): Svenska överord. Eslöv 1999, 75–92. 
15   See for example: Klinge, Matti: Runebergs två fosterland. Helsingfors 1983; Karvonen, Lauri: 
“Likadan på ett annat sätt. Sverige som motpol och model”. In: Historisk tidskrift för Finland, 
77 (1992), 529–547; Tarkiainen, Kari: Finnarnas historia i Sverige 2. Helsingfors 1993; Tar-
kiainen, Kari: “Svenska finlandsuppfattningar under 200 år”. In: Anders Björnsson and Tapani 
Suominen (eds.): Det hotade landet och det skyddade. Stockholm 1999, 67–86; Sjöstrand, Per 
Olof: Hur Finland vanns för Sverige – En historia för nationalstater. Uppsala 1996; Elenius 
1999, as footnote 14 (though Elenius says that the loss of Finland in 1809 was a national 
trauma, he has a long term perspective on how the cession of Finland was perceived in Swe-
den during the 19th and 20th centuries); Sandström, Åke: “Den svenska identiteten och synen 
på Finland 1808–1860”. In: Tapani Suominen (ed.): Statsmannakonst eller opportunism. En 
antologi om 1812 års politik. Stockholm 2002, 191–205; Idem: “Sverige 1809–1864”. In: 
Max Engman and Åke Sandström (eds): Det nya Norden efter Napoleon. Stockholm 2004, 
262–263; Idem: “Sökandet efter en ny svensk identitet – Om svensk självsyn och synen på 
Finland 1808-1860”. In: Max Engman and Nils Erik Villstrand (eds): Maktens mosaik – En-
het, särart och självbild i det svenska riket. Helsingfors 2008, 381–402; Jansson, Torkel: “Två 
stater – en kultur”. In: Tapani Suominen (ed.): Sverige i fred, statsmannakonst eller opportun-
ism: en antologi om 1812 års politik. Stockholm 2002, 151–176; Idem 2009, as footnote 1; 
Samuelsson, Jan: Eliten, riket och riksdelningen:sociala nätverk och geografisk mobilitet mel-
lan Sverige och Finland 1720–1820. Helsingfors 2008; Edgren, Henrik: Publicitet för med-
borgsmannavett – Det nationellt svenska i Stockholmstidningar 1810–1831. Uppsala 2005; 
Idem:  “Nationell katastrof, bortglömmande eller ointresse? Finland i Sverige från 
rikssprängningen fram till 1830-talet”. In: Malmborg 2009, as footnote 1, 299–318.
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Was the loss of Finland a Swedish national trauma? 
The loss of Finland was certainly a disaster for the king, Gustav IV Adolf, and his 
leading officials in the government and military as well as for the participating soldiers 
and their families, who had lost their loved ones. But was it really a trauma or crisis 
for the national Swedish identity? Did a large number of people mourn the loss of 
Finland? Is it appropriate at all to talk about a widespread common national identity in 
the beginning of the 19
th century, when mass nationalism was a phenomenon that did 
not occur until the second half of the 19
th century? 
It is difficult to estimate the attitudes of a large population or of a public opinion. 
However, there are some institutions in a society that can be regarded as indicators of 
views among a greater number of people. One such institution is the political press, 
which is a kind of representative or a mouthpiece of a public opinion. If the loss of 
Finland was apprehended as a national catastrophe, there should plausibly have been 
some screaming about it in contemporary newspapers and lampoons. 
This was not the case, however. It is really remarkable that the cession of Finland was 
very seldom discussed at all in Swedish newspapers and lampoons during and after the 
war. The results of the major battles were only reported (for example the surrender of 
Sveaborg in May 1808), and there were no longer articles contemplating how disas-
trous it was that Sweden was losing the war and how precarious the political situation 
was when Russian troops were controlling the northern parts of Sweden proper.
16 Not 
even after the coup d’état in March 1809, when there suddenly were opportunities for 
a free press to prosper, were there such articles in the newspapers. Instead of an at-
mosphere of national trauma, there were celebrations and festivities in Stockholm during 
the spring and early summer of 1809, especially around the 6
th of June, when the new 
constitution was legislated. In spite of the debacle in Finland, the leading commanders 
of the Finnish army – Wilhelm Mauritz Klingspor and Carl Johan Adlercreutz – were 
honoured with medals and poems for their war efforts.
17
The mourning of the partition of the state seems to have been overshadowed by the 
celebration of the dethroning of the king Gustav IV Adolf and the forging of a new 
 
 
 
16   Sandström 2008, as footnote 15, 387. 
17   Sandström 2002, as footnote 15, 195. 
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power balancing constitution. Maybe the loss of Finland did not matter to public opin-
ion or perhaps the people counted on recapturing Finland in a near future. It is how-
ever evident that there was no loud voice crying in the newspapers and lampoons 
about how the Swedish national pride had been mutilated when Finland was lost.
18
In January 1810 there was nevertheless an exception to the silence about Finland in the 
political press. In the paper Journal för Litteraturen och Theatern one writer expressed 
gratitude to all men who had fought bravely on the battlefields of Revolax, Lappo and 
Alavo. It was important that these “Finns” (finnar) were not forgotten, even if the 
situation in Sweden was precarious and turbulent at the moment.
19 It is not obvious 
what the writer really referred to when the concept of finnar (Finns) was used. Today it 
is quite undisputable that a “Finn” (en finne) is a person with ethnic Finnish origin 
who speaks Finnish and is accustomed to a typical Finnish culture, etc. In the context 
of 1809 however, a “Finn” could also be just a person who fought in the war against 
Russia.
20 It did not matter if he was born in Sweden or in any other country. It was also 
irrelevant if he lacked Finnish ethnic origin or had no knowledge of the Finnish lan-
guage; he was still considered a “Finn.” In the same way, the definition of a “Swede”, 
or a person of any other nationality, was not necessarily characterized solely by ethnicity 
and language as it was later in the 19
th century.
21 Accordingly, since people did not iden-
tify themselves primarily by national origin, it is quite confusing and even perhaps 
anachronistic to presuppose that the nationalistic feelings were the same in the early 
19
th as in the late 19
th century. Probably, people thought that they belonged to a family, 
guild, village, region, state, king and a religion, rather than being a part of a unique 
ethnic and cultural nation. Even if it is deceptive to describe the reactions among the 
Swedish populace as a national trauma, people must of course have been upset when 
Finland was lost since it doubtlessly was a harsh military defeat. This was also a fact 
in some circles. 
 
 
 
18  Torvald T:son Höjer, a prestigious historian in Sweden during the first half of the 20th 
century, argued that the peace treaty in Fredrikshamn in fact was a “mutilation” of the 
Swedish “state body” and that it resulted in wounds that, 150 years later, had not yet 
healed. See Höjer 1954, as footnote 14, 134.
19   Journal för Litteraturen och Theatern, No. 7, 10th Jan 1810. 
20   Sandström 2008, as footnote 15, 486.
21   Edgren 2005, as footnote 15, 307ff.
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In some contexts there were outspoken manifestos of revenge and a recapture of 
Finland. In 1811, for example, the “Gothic Association” (Götiska Förbundet) was 
founded. Here some of the most prominent Swedish authors, officials, university 
teachers, politicians and priests participated, such as Gudmund Göran Adlerbeth, 
Esaias Tegnér and Erik Gustaf Geijer. The purpose was to rebuild the Swedish national 
identity and to revive older Swedish values from ancient times. Early on, for example 
in Tegnér´s famous poem Svea, there were ideas of recapturing Finland.
22 There were 
also similar thoughts among some former participants in the war, especially among 
those who were born in Finland.
23 There were some signs of national shame or a trauma 
among a very limited number of Swedish people, but still, they were surprisingly few. 
The period of 1811–1812 was the first and only time during the 1810s and 1820s when 
some newspapers solidly discussed the result of the war and if Sweden should recap-
ture its former eastern half. Three newspapers were involved: Allmän Politisk Jurnal, 
Nya Posten and Skandinaven. The editor of Allmän Politisk Jurnal, Adolf Regnér, 
published an article about a possible reunion of Sweden and Finland. Regnér as-
serted that this was a likely scenario, but Sweden could not realize it on its own or just 
with the assistance of the inhabitants of Finland. Regnér’s solution was that Napoleon 
and France had to assist Sweden. To get the support from Napoleon, Sweden needed to 
regain her confidence by severing all economic and political ties to Great Britain. 
Regnér also thought that the Russians would voluntarily agree to let Finland go, if 
French troops supported the Russians in their war against the Ottoman Empire. He also 
foresaw a future conflict between Russia and France, which actually occurred in the 
summer of 1812 when French troops invaded Russia.
24  
Regnér was not alone in Sweden hoping for French assistance in a recapture of 
Finland. Indeed, one of the main reasons for electing the French marshal Jean Baptiste 
Bernadotte as the new Swedish successor to the throne in the summer of 1810 was the 
expectation of support from France (Napoleon) in a new war against Russia. However, 
 
 
 
22   In the lampoon of Per Elgström from 1810, Om ett patriotiskt tänkesätt (“About patriotism”), 
there were similar addresses. 
23  Gustaf Adolf Montgomery, who participated in the war, wrote in 1812 a proclamation to 
the Finnish people where he encouraged them to revolt against the Russian emperor. See 
Tarkiainen 1993, as footnote 15, 77.
24   Allmän Politisk Jurnal,. No. 3, 14th Sep 1811.
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it was soon obvious that Bernadotte and Napoleon were far from good friends. Instead, 
Bernadotte realised that the most strategic action was to become an ally with Alexan-
der I of Russia and consequently cancel any plans for recapturing Finland. With help 
from Russia and her allies, Sweden could instead ,diplomatically conquer‛ Norway. 
This is in fact what happened when Bernadotte, in the autumn of 1812, promised 
Swedish support to Russia and its allies in the battles against France. In exchange 
Alexander guaranteed that Russia would help Sweden gain Norway, which was realized 
in the autumn of 1814.
25 This shift in Swedish foreign policy, when Bernadotte strived 
to stay on good terms with the great powers of both Russia and Great Britain, is called 
“the policy of 1812” and is sometimes interpreted as a first step towards the well-
known neutrality policy that characterized Swedish foreign relations during the 20
th 
century.
26  
“The policy of 1812” was evident when Swedish officials reacted to Regnér´s article. 
Since Bernadotte and Sweden now planned to build an alliance with Russia, it was not 
considered appropriate for the Swedish public to discuss a recapture of Finland. There-
fore, Allmän Politisk Jurnal was withdrawn and Regnér was prosecuted. He was sen-
tenced to three years in prison. Concerning sensitive foreign policy matters, there was 
apparently no freedom of the press. 
Karl XIV Johan did not only act repressively against bold and outspoken publicists, he 
also actively supported publicists to write articles in accordance with “the policy of 
1812”. For example, the publicist Carl Axel Grevesmöhlen was paid to compose texts 
which supported the opinions of Karl XIV Johan. In a newspaper – Skandinaven (“The 
Scandinave”) – he promulgated that Finland had been a very expensive province, 
which had not benefited Sweden at all. Further, Sweden was at the moment not able to 
defend Finland with its own forces; it needed alliances to achieve the necessary mili-
tary power against a Russian aggressor. The only alternative at the time was a very 
hazardous alliance with France, which would most likely result in a conflict with Rus-
 
 
 
25   There were some minor battles between Swedish and Norwegian forces during a couple of 
weeks the summer of 1814. However, the Swedish military was superior and the fighting 
soon ended.
26  For a discussion on the historical roots of Swedish neutrality policy in the early 19
th cen-
tury, see Wahlbäck, Krister: The roots of Swedish neutrality. Stockholm 1986; Talvitie, 
Heikki: “Sverige och 1812 års politik”. In: Suominen 2002, as footnote 15, 15–74.
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sia and Great Britain. After the partitioning of Sweden, Grevesmöhlen stipulated that 
Sweden dared not risk another devastating attack; instead the time had come to im-
prove relations with Russia. Grevesmöhlen´s solution to better relations was to de-
velop commerce between the two former arch rivals.
27 “The policy of 1812” could not 
have been mediated in a more proper way. The newspaper’s name Skandinaven also 
clearly indicated that Sweden now should turn westwards towards the Scandinavian 
peninsula, and accordingly abandon Finland. The publicist Bengt Johan Törnebladh 
strongly opposed the opinions of Grevesmöhlen in the newspaper Nya Posten. Törne-
bladh believed that the economic assets of Finland had been very poorly utilized. Quite 
contrary to Grevesmöhlen, Törnebladh argued that Sweden was still able to defend 
Finland militarily, without any support from foreign powers. The loss of Finland was 
not, he emphasized, a guarantee to hinder future Russian assaults on Sweden.
28
During the following years, there were conspicuously few newspaper articles and lam-
poons written about the partition of the state. On a few occasions there were some 
paragraphs dealing with the commerce between Finland and Sweden and how Swedish 
agricultural production was affected by competition from Finnish agricultural arti-
cles.
29 Of course, judging from the fate of Adolf Regnér, it could be fatal to put for-
ward a literal recapture of Finland. There were still many other subjects to write about 
where Finland could get attention. Nothing at all was written about the fact that 
Finland had belonged to Sweden for 600 years, whether Sweden had benefited from 
Finland or about how the Finnish army and lower classes of the society in Finland had 
bravely fought against the Russians. 
However, the new political situation in Finland was at least discussed in a couple of 
articles in the newspaper Nya Extra Posten in 1821. Critical views about the situation 
in Finland were very rare due to “the policy of 1812.” That is why these articles in Nya 
Extra Posten deserve attention. The publicist, who was the early Finnish nationalist 
Adolf Iwar Arwidsson, criticized how the Finns had become too dependent and subor-
dinate to the Russians. He did not like the mix of love and fear the Finnish people held 
 
 
 
27   Skandinaven, No. 3, 25
th Apr 1812; Skandinaven, No. 4 , 27
th Apr 1812; Skandinaven, No. 
6, 2
nd May 1812. 
28   Nya Posten, No. 36, 8th May 1812; Nya Posten, No. 38, 14
th May 1812.  
29   Allmänna Journalen, No 108, 12th May 1820; Journalen, No. 91, 22
nd Apr 1825; Gran-
skaren, No. 60, 26
th Jul 1822; Argus den IV, No. 33, 15
th Oct 1823. 
76 NORDEUROPAforum 19 (2009:2) When Finland was lost  
for Alexander I. Most of all, Arwidsson pointed out that the national army, founded on 
the allotment system, was abolished in the Borgå agreement of 1809.
 30 For him such 
an army was the prerequisite for a national spirit. The main problem for Arwidsson 
was that Finland, under Russian rule, jeopardized its unique national spirit and aware-
ness. Arwidsson was undoubtedly inspired by the romantic views of a nation and a 
“Volksgeist” promoted by German philosophers like Herder, Fichte and Hegel. Ar-
widsson was also critical of the way Finland had been governed while it still belonged 
to Sweden. He meant that Finland was often looked upon as inferior; too often offi-
cials in the military and public administration saw a mission in Finland as a degrada-
tion. Further, Arwidsson asserted that Sweden had “drained” Finland of talented and 
competent politicians, scientists, militaries and authors.
31  
Arwidsson´s article was the starting point for a rather intensive debate in Sweden at 
the end of the 1830s when some prominent scholars and debaters, like Erik Gustaf 
Geijer and Israel Hwasser, argued that the agreement of Borgå in March 1809 guaran-
teed Finland extensive autonomy.
32 Others, like Arwidsson, emphatically asserted that 
Finland suffered harsh conditions under Russian rule.
33
 
 
 
30  The allotment system was a way to organize the military forces of Sweden. It was founded 
around 1680 and lasted until 1901. Each province had its own regiment. It included a system 
with permanently recruited “career” soldiers. To avoid the risk of being involuntarily recruited, 
the farmers and country people accepted a system which guaranteed that they would not be re-
quired to perform military service. The condition was that they provide the army with soldiers. 
Farmers in a “rote” (ward) provided one soldier to the regiment of that province. The size of a 
“rote” depended on how much it could harvest. For more information about the allotment sys-
tem, see Thisner, Fredrik: “Manning the armed forces: the Swedish solution”. In: Frederick 
Schneid and Harold Blanton (eds.): Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: a revolution in mili-
tary affairs. London / New York 2008, 162–174.
31   Nya Extra Posten, No. 76, 21  September 1820
st ; Nya Extra Posten, No. 78, 28  September 
1820
th
.
32   Borgå lantdag, which ended the 18
th of July 1809, was a kind of agreement between Alexander 
I and the Finnish people. In a way, Finland was organized as a state with limited autonomy. It 
could decide what to do with taxes from Finnish territories; Finland got its own state budget; a 
Finnish government was formed which governed two different departments: one for economy 
and one for the judicature. Many people in Finland, especially among higher social groups, saw 
the conditions of Borgå lantdag as a considerable improvement compared with the system un-
der Swedish rule. About Borgå lantdag, see, e.g. Hårdstedt as footnote 2, 288.  
33   See Jansson 2009, as footnote 1, 57ff.
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One way to handle the partition of the state seems to have been to promulgate or invent 
national differences between the Swedish and the Finnish people. As I mentioned before, 
when Finland and Sweden were parts of the same realm, national identification was not 
particularly common. The meanings of the concepts “Swedish” and “Finnish” were not 
obvious. The newspaper Granskaren, which was supported financially by king Karl XIV 
Johan, asserted that nowhere else in the world two nations living next to each other, like 
the Swedes and the Finns, gave witness to such explicit differences.  
The publicist Hans Axel Lindgren meant that it was surprising that the realm of Sweden 
and Finland had lasted for so long. Like Arwidsson, Lindgren was convinced that a state 
could only consist of one unique ethnic nationality.
34 In spite of the fact that Finland had 
been an integrated part of Sweden for hundreds of years – just as integrated as, and some-
times even more incorporated, than provinces like Dalecarlia, Scania or Småland – the 
relationship between Sweden and Finland was now described as artificial and impossible 
to have been sustained in the long run.
35 Lindgren´s opinions are quite remarkable since 
Finland before 1809 was hardly perceived as unique state or nation in an alliance with 
Sweden.
36 Lindgren did not discuss the fact that many “Finns” spoke the Swedish lan-
guage as a mother tongue and that they were, from a cultural point of view, just as Swed-
ish as the people who lived on the other side of the Gulf of Bothnia. It is obvious that the 
official policy of Sweden, in accordance with the “policy of 1812”, was to forget the fact 
that Finland had been a part of Sweden for 600 years. 
The erasing of Finland from the Swedish consciousness was also evident in historical 
surveys of Sweden-Finland before 1809. By the 1820s, historians like Erik Gustaf Gei-
jer were already writing the history of Sweden from the territorial perspective of post-
 
 
 
34   Granskaren, No. 96, 8th Dec 1826.
35   Ibid.
36  For more information about different interpretations on Finland’s position within the Swedish 
realm before 1809, see Nordin, Jonas: Ett fattigt men fritt folk: nationell och politisk självbild i 
Sverige från sen stormaktstid till slutet av frihetstiden. Stockholm 2000; Eng, Torbjörn: Det 
svenska väldet: ett konglomerat av uttrycksformer och begrepp från Vasa till Bernadotte. Upp-
sala 2001.
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1809 Sweden. Accordingly, Finland was seldom mentioned at all or it was asserted 
that Finland and Sweden were separate units in a realm predestined to fall apart.
37
At the end of the 1820s Finland became more visible in newspaper articles. Still, the 
“policy of 1812” had a lot of influence. One example is when Journalen in 1826 wrote 
about the death of Alexander I. It was promulgated that all Finns were very sad when 
they received news of the death of the noble and generous emperor. According to 
Granskaren, and of course Karl XIV Johan, Alexander I had made Finland prosperous 
in many ways.
38  
One year later Granskaren described the devastating fire in Åbo, which had ravaged 
the city. Here, quite unexpectedly, it was remarked that Sweden always had been a pro-
tector of Finland’s freedom and rights.
39 Probably, centuries would pass before the 
ancient brotherhood of Swedes and Finns disappeared. The publicist also declared that 
Sweden always felt a great deal of pain when provinces were lost. It is quite remark-
able that the loss of Finland was interpreted as equal to the loss of Scania in the 14
th 
century and the loss of Swedish Pomerania in 1814.
40 Accordingly, the partition of the 
state in 1809 was not asserted as a uniquely painful moment in Swedish history. 
In 1830, when the Poles revolted against the Russians, some Swedish publicists took 
the opportunity to write about Finland as well. Especially liberal and radical newspa-
pers like Aftonbladet and Den Svenske Medborgaren dared to assert that, in opposition 
to the “policy of 1812,” there was some discontent among the Finnish country people 
against the Russian rule. Further, Aftonbladet and Den Svenske Medborgaren promul-
gated that the Finnish soldiers who participated on the Russian side in fighting down 
the Polish rebellion did so involuntarily and without enthusiasm.
41
 
 
 
37   See for example Geijer, Erik Gustaf: ”Svenska folkets historia. Första delen till Gustav 
Vasa”. In: Erik Gustav Geijers samlade skrifter, Sednare afdelningen. Vol. 2, Stockholm 
1832. About the erasing of Finland in Swedish history writing after 1809, see Klinge 1983, 
as footnote 15; Sjöstrand 1996, as footnote 15; Elenius 1999, as footnote 14.
38   Journalen, No. 40, 17th Feb 1826.
39  It is remarkable is that this was in a way still the case, since the Swedish law of 1734, 
1772 and 1779 remained valid in Finland.
40   Granskaren, No. 74, 21st Sep 1827.
41   Aftonbladet, No. 143, 25th Jun 1831; Aftonbladet, No. 144, 27th Jun 1831; Den Svenske 
Medborgaren, No. 43, 28th Jun 1831; Den Svenske Medborgaren, No. 44, 1st Jul 1831.
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Even if there were some articles about Finland in Swedish newspapers in the 1810s 
and 1820s, they were surprisingly few considering how long Finland had been a part 
of Sweden, and considering how many Swedish historians have taken it for granted 
that the partitioning of the state in 1809 was a contemporary national trauma. The sub-
jects of the articles mostly focused on the situation in Finland after 1809, and not on 
how it was a disaster for Sweden that Finland was lost. Of course it was very risky to 
propose a recapture of Finland, but there were many other Swedish-Finnish perspec-
tives possible to deal with. In earlier times of press repression in Sweden, writers were 
very innovative in using metaphors and allegories when they wanted to expose forbid-
den or delicate subjects. If the loss of Finland had been looked upon as a real contem-
porary national trauma, there should have been more newspaper articles about Finland. 
A national trauma for migration, education and the economy? 
The newspapers quite often emphasized that Sweden and Finland still had strong mu-
tual economical connections.
42 Concerning the economy, the partition of the state defi-
nitely did not result in a national trauma. During the 1810s there was more commerce 
between Sweden and Finland than ever before. For example, Sweden imported cattle, 
fish, timber and corn from Finland and exported iron ore, lime stone and construction 
stones to Finland. In fact, Sweden imported more goods from Finland than it ex-
ported.
43 People, as well as goods, continued to travel across the Gulf of Bothnia after 
1809. People moved to Sweden or Finland permanently or temporarily due to work, 
marriage, studies or economic reasons. In the 1810s there were approximately 1000 
travels each year crossing the Gulf of Bothnia. One important change after the parti-
tion of the state was the prohibition of ownership of land or other properties in both 
Sweden and Finland. Wealthy people consequently had to decide which state, Sweden 
or Russia, they wanted to live in. Some important state officials moved from Sweden 
 
 
 
42   See for example, Allmänna Journalen,  No. 108,  12th May 1820;  Journalen,  No. 91, 
22nd Apr 1825; Granskaren, No. 60, 26th Jul 1822; Argus den IV, No. 33, 15th Oct 1823; 
Den Svenske Medborgaren, No. 59, 23rd Aug 1831; Den Svenske Medborgaren, No. 88, 
6th Dec 1831.
43   Samuelsson, Kurt: “Den ekonomiska betydelsen för Stockholm av Finlands förlust”. In: 
Skrifter utgifna av Sjöhistoriska samfundet. Vol. 5, Uppsala 1945, 24–54, here 32. 
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to Finland, since the Russian authorities gave priority to well educated immigrants and 
therefore offered good conditions when they moved to Finland. Others moved in the 
opposite direction. So did the famous professor and writer Frans Michael Franzén. He 
emigrated from Åbo to the Swedish parish of Kumla.
44
At Uppsala University, there was a Finnish student corporation (Finska nationen). In 
spite of the partition of the state in 1809, students kept on coming to Uppsala from 
Finland. During the years of 1808–1835 around 70 Finnish students were members of 
Finska nationen. It prospered during the 1810s and had a lot of activities. Adolf Iwar 
Arwidsson was one of its active members and leaders. One problem was that the Rus-
sian government in Finland actively tried to prevent Finnish youngsters from going to 
Sweden for university studies. Therefore it was decided that officials in the Russian 
state administration needed university exams from Russian universities only. Conse-
quently, Finnish students chose to attend the universities of Helsinki (transferred there 
from Åbo in 1827) or Saint Petersburg instead of Uppsala University.
45  
In Stockholm, the Finnish church congregation was a place for social and cultural ac-
tivities between Swedes and Finns. During the 18
th century the Finnish congregation 
was an important meeting place for people from the Finnish provinces living in Stock-
holm. In this congregation, members came from different regions in Sweden. After 
1809 the activities of the Finnish congregation continued pretty much in the same way 
as before, even if it was not possible to be a member of the congregation if one were a 
citizen of the Russian Empire.
46
Conclusion 
Apart from the undisputable political fact that Sweden and Finland were separate po-
litical entities after 1809 there were obviously many cultural, economical, social and 
even political examples of how the connections and relationship between Sweden and 
Finland did not change after the partitioning of the Swedish state. In some cases, both 
Finland and Sweden even prospered. The fact that the Swedish political press was not 
 
 
 
44   Tarkiainen 1993, as footnote 15, 98.
45   Ibid., 52.
46   Ibid., 30ff.
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particularly bothered by the loss of Finland also demonstrates that the “business as 
usual” attitude was prevalent. Consequently, the nationalist description of a country 
drowned in national despair after 1809 must be questioned. It is doubtlessly a histori-
cal interpretation chiefly influenced by the nationalist paradigm which dominated 
Swedish historical research and writing at the end of the 19
th century. The most impor-
tant message in this article has accordingly been to emphasize the need to look beyond 
such starting points. Doubtlessly, more research must be performed on how common 
people – from different social groups and geographical regions – in Sweden as well as 
in Finland experienced the partitioning of the state. 
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